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STRIKING A BALANCE: WHEN TO EXTEND
THE RIGHT TO RESCIND UNDER TILA
KIMBERLEY AYER †
INTRODUCTION
Before the subprime mortgage market collapsed, a number of
public figures warned of the oncoming crisis. In May 2007,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke gave a speech at
the Federal Reserve Bank in Chicago on the development of the
subprime mortgage market since the 1990s. 1 In that speech,
Bernanke laid out the background of the subprime mortgage
market and the growth of the secondary mortgage market. 2
Almost a year later, Lydia B. Parnes, the Director of the Bureau
of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”), delivered a prepared statement in which she voiced the
FTC’s “concern[s] about the rise in delinquencies and foreclosures
in the subprime market, and the impact on communities . . . [as
well as the FTC’s] commit[ment] to using all of its tools to protect
consumers in [that] market.” 3 Parnes went on to enumerate the
†
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1
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago’s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition: The
Subprime Mortgage Market (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm Bernanke explained that
the expansion of the subprime mortgage market in the 1990s was “spurred in large
part by innovations that reduced the costs for lenders of assessing and pricing risks,”
“technological advances [that] facilitated credit scoring by making it easier for
lenders to collect and disseminate information on the creditworthiness of prospective
borrowers,” and “new techniques [developed by lenders] for using this information
to determine underwriting standards, set interest rates, and manage their risks.” Id.
2
See id. (noting that “subprime mortgage lending began to expand in earnest in
the mid-1990s, the expansion spurred in large part by innovations that reduced the
costs for lenders of assessing and pricing risks”).
3
Improving Consumer Protections in Subprime Lending: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Interstate Commerce, Trade & Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci. & Transp., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Lydia B. Parnes, Director,
Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC).
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FTC’s various mechanisms for protecting consumers in the
subprime market, including bringing a number of legal actions
against mortgage institutions and other mortgage industry
entities, 4 educating consumers in how mortgage lending works, 5
and conducting continuing research in order to understand the
ever-changing mortgage market and develop policies to better
protect borrowers. 6
One of the most powerful tools borrowers have at their
disposal to protect themselves from unscrupulous lenders is the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). 7 Under TILA, borrowers have
the right to rescind a mortgage transaction for up to three years
if the lender fails to adhere to the requirements of the Act, 8
including failing to disclose the expiration date of the three-day
rescission period to which all borrowers are entitled. 9 Until
recently, various circuit courts have employed what is essentially
a strict liability standard, finding that a relatively minor
technical violation of TILA entitles a borrower to the extended
three-year rescission period. 10 Recently, however, the First
Circuit split from tradition and established a new “reasonable
person” test to determine whether a borrower understood that he
had three days to rescind his mortgage transaction. Under this
test, if an average, reasonable borrower would have understood
that he had three days to rescind the transaction, then the court
will not extend the rescission period to three years. 11
This Note argues that the reasonable person standard that
the First Circuit implemented in Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp. 12
to determine whether a consumer has a right to the three-year
See id. at 5–12.
See id. at 12–13.
6
See id. at 13–17.
7
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667(f) (2006).
8
See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); infra notes 49–51.
9
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2010).
10
See, e.g., Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 704
(9th Cir. 1986) (finding that even a minor technical violation of the Act such as
failure to include the expiration date of the rescission period entitled the borrower to
the extended rescission period); Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768 (5th Cir.
1983) (holding that “failure properly to complete the right to rescission form
automatically violates the Act” and that “failure to fill in the expiration date of the
rescission form is a violation”).
11
See Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 312–13 (1st Cir. 2009) (ruling
that when “a reasonable borrower cannot have been misled,” it is inappropriate to
allow the extended rescission period), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010).
12
Id.
4
5
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extended rescission period is not practicable in light of the recent
subprime mortgage crisis and the predatory practices that
characterized subprime lending.
Part I.A explains the
background of the proliferation of subprime mortgages and the
eventual crisis that they caused in the mortgage market.
Part I.B contains a brief history of the Truth in Lending Act, as
well as a more detailed discussion of a consumer’s rescission
rights under that Act. Part II.A lays out the methodology that
various circuit courts have used to determine whether a borrower
is entitled to the extended rescission period. Part II.B explains
how the First Circuit recently departed from this long-used
methodology by implementing a reasonable person test instead of
the traditional “strict liability” standard. Part III argues that
while the First Circuit was correct to reject the traditional strict
liability standard, its new reasonable person test fails to take
into account the realities of predatory lending. Predatory lenders
specifically target potential borrowers that they perceive as
vulnerable—borrowers that they can scare into taking on a
subprime loan, who are in some way less likely to understand
fully the transaction. 13 Because predatory lenders do not target
the average, reasonable consumer, it is unfair to apply a
reasonable person standard when determining a consumer’s
rights.
When lenders do not include the expiration date of the
rescission period in the borrower’s paperwork, courts should
employ a rebuttable presumption that the borrower did not know
when the rescission period ended and is entitled to the extended
three-year rescission period. Such a presumption would uphold
the purpose of TILA by providing protection for the borrower and
also would ensure that lenders have an incentive to include the
expiration date of the rescission period in the borrower’s
rescission notice. The burden of proof must be on the lender to
rebut that presumption by demonstrating that the borrower did
know when the three-day rescission period expired. Use of this
rebuttable presumption would result in two significant benefits.
First, courts would be able to provide relief to consumers who
were taken advantage of by predatory lenders during the
13
See Joshua M. Stolly, Comment, Subprime Lending: Ohioans Fall Prey to
Predatory Lending at Record Levels—What Next? 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 289, 294–96
(2008) (outlining the various groups predatory lenders target because they perceive
those groups as vulnerable).
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subprime mortgage boom. Second, courts would not be forced to
reward consumers who did understand the nature of the
rescission period but nevertheless are attempting to use a minor
technical TILA violation as a loophole to get out of a bad
mortgage.
I.
A.

SUBPRIME MORTGAGES AND TILA

The Rise and Fall of the Subprime Mortgage Market

Subprime mortgage lending is tailored to those borrowers
who have less than pristine credit. 14 With the rise of subprime
mortgages in the 1990s, gone were the days in which local banks
issued mortgages only “to individuals with perfect or near-perfect
credit” and “held on to the loans and provided all the necessary
servicing and documentation.” 15 At the same time, lending
institutions began issuing subprime loans with exorbitantly high
interest rates to individual consumers with poor credit who
otherwise would not have been able to obtain mortgages. 16
Private banks purchased subprime loans, packaged them as
“collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or collateralized mortgage
obligations (CMOs),” and made them available to mutual funds
and pension plans for investment. 17 This practice led to an

14
See Solomon Maman, Note, New Tools for Combating Unfair, Deceptive and
Abusive Mortgage Practices: New Amendments to Regulation Z, 21 LOY. CONSUMER
L. REV. 194, 199 (2008) (“The term ‘Subprime Lending’ was coined sometime in the
early 1990s by the securitization industry, Wall Street firms or rating agencies in an
attempt to distinguish securities backed by mortgages made to borrowers with
excellent credit from securities backed by mortgages made to borrowers with
impaired credit.”); see also Jonathan Macey et al., Helping Law Catch up to Markets:
Applying Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 798–99
(2009) (defining subprime mortgage lending as “the making of loans to people with
less than perfect creditworthiness” and emphasizing that “the key point is that
subprime loans are those to borrowers whose risk profile makes default a more
realistic possibility than for those made to prime borrowers”).
15
Macey et al., supra note 14, at 799.
16
See Stolly, supra note 13, at 293. The author recounts an instance in which he
was solicited by an insurance agent to refinance his home, was quoted a nineteen
percent interest rate, and told that only subprime borrowers paid such an exorbitant
rate. See id. at 289–90.
17
Macey et al., supra note 14, at 800; see also Bernanke, supra note 1 (noting
that “regulatory changes and other developments have permitted lenders to more
easily sell mortgages to financial intermediaries, who in turn pool mortgages and
sell the cash flows as structured securities”).
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“influx of money into the subprime mortgage lending industry,”
which made mortgages available to a larger number of
Americans who previously would not have been eligible. 18
At first blush, the proliferation of subprime mortgages
appeared to have a positive impact on American home
ownership. 19 Subprime mortgage lending was seen “in many
cases . . . [as] a welcome financing tool to those who could not
otherwise obtain home mortgage financing.” 20 Indeed, subprime
lending principally became known as a way for consumers who
would typically have been excluded from the mortgage market to
become homeowners. 21
Subprime mortgages were not, however, the boon to highrisk prospective homeowners that they seemed to be at first.
Such mortgages came with extremely stringent terms that
seemed almost to set up the consumer for failure. 22 Because
subprime lenders were taking on “the additional risk correlated
with low credit scores,” 23 lenders charged higher interest rates
than they would charge for prime loans 24 and included
prepayment penalties in the terms of subprime loans. 25
Consumers were hooked into signing on to subprime mortgages
despite these unfavorable terms because many such mortgages
Macey et al., supra note 14, at 800.
See id. at 799 (noting that traditional mortgage “terms and the credit
requirements meant that only middle- and upper-class Americans were able to
obtain mortgages, making it hard for large segments of the population to own
homes”). The article goes on to add that these traditional requirements led to a
disparate impact on racial minorities. See id.
20
Stolly, supra note 13, at 293.
21
Maman, supra note 14 (“Subprime lending carved its niche in the consumer
credit market by providing a source of funds for those borrowers who were
underserved by commercial banks and thrifts, borrowers with blemished credit
characteristics, borrowers with low-to-moderate income, and minorities.”).
22
See Robert Murken, Comment, Can’t Get No Satisfaction? Revising How
Courts Rescind Home Equity Loans Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 TEMP. L.
REV. 457, 462 (2004) (noting that “many subprime loans can create their own risk by
saddling a borrower of limited means, who was nonetheless able to maintain
payments on her prior debt load, with a loan she simply cannot afford, which pushes
her over the edge into default”).
23
Macey et al., supra note 14, at 801.
24
See Murken, supra note 22 (stating that subprime mortgages that cross the
line into predatory lending “include interest rates well above the market
rate, . . . which typically do not reflect the actual risk of the loan”).
25
See Macey et al., supra note 14, at 801 (describing a prepayment penalty as “a
charge to the mortgage holder for paying off a mortgage before the payments are
due” and noting that such penalties “are present in roughly 80% of subprime loans
but only 2% of prime loans”).
18
19
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“often feature[d] two-year low ‘teaser’ rates before switching to a
high floating-interest rate.” 26 While the housing market was still
booming, more savvy consumers were able to avoid the floatinginterest rate by beginning “cycle[s] of refinancing upon the end of
the two-year ‘teaser’ period.” 27
Chairman Bernanke warned of serious problems developing
in the subprime mortgage market, including a high level of
delinquencies, 28 a corresponding rise in home foreclosures, 29 and
rapidly falling home values. 30 Many of these problems were a
direct result of the widespread practice of extending subprime
loans to high-risk consumers, 31 who were ultimately unable to
repay their mortgages and defaulted. 32
In fact, at the time of Bernanke’s speech, the subprime
market was already in a tailspin, fueled by increasing corruption
in the secondary mortgage market. 33 One major factor that
initiated the corruption was the collateralization of subprime
mortgages; “because the originators and brokers did not hold the
loans they created, standards and diligence in originating loans
were compromised.” 34 Further contributing to the instability in
the mortgage market was the change in compensation for
mortgage brokers from a fixed salary to a commission-based

Id. at 802.
Id.
28
See Bernanke, supra note 1 (stating that “the rate of serious delinquencies—
corresponding to mortgages in foreclosure or with payments ninety days or more
overdue—rose sharply during 2006 and recently stood at about 11 percent, about
double the recent low seen in mid-2005”).
29
See id. (“In the fourth quarter of 2006, about 310,000 foreclosure proceedings
were initiated, whereas for the preceding two years the quarterly average was
roughly 230,000. Subprime mortgages accounted for more than half of the
foreclosures started in the fourth quarter.”).
30
See id.
31
See Stolly, supra note 13, at 294 (“Subprime borrowers’ high risks are
generally caused by delinquencies, charge-offs, judgments, foreclosures,
bankruptcies, debt-to-income ratios, and low credit scores.”).
32
See id. at 291 (characterizing subprime lending as “one form of predatory
lending” and noting that “victims frequently fail to meet their heavily lopsided
financial obligations and are forced into foreclosure”).
33
See id. at 294 (noting that although “[t]heoretically, subprime lending is
completely ethical . . . [it] runs afoul and turns predatory when the lenders use
illegal and/or unethical tactics to secure the loans, or worse, when they offer
subprime loans to those who qualify for prime loan treatment”). The author goes on
to describe typical predatory lending practices. See id. at 294–99.
34
Macey et al., supra note 15, at 801.
26
27
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salary, which led mortgage brokers to issue increasingly risky
mortgages to clients who in the past would not have been able to
get a mortgage, in order to boost their own salaries. 35
Finally, lenders engaged in predatory practices, specifically
targeting consumers based on factors such as race, gender,
age, and economic status. 36 Predatory lenders steered those
borrowers toward subprime mortgages that the lenders knew
those consumers could never afford 37 or got them involved in
procedures such as flipping, 38 practices that imposed severe
financial burdens on consumers who were ill-equipped to take on
such burdens. Moreover, predatory lenders created “no doc
loans” and “liar loans,” which allowed consumers to obtain
mortgages either without including their income information or
by affirmatively misrepresenting their income. 39 In return for
the risk of extending credit to such financially unstable

35
See Macey et al., supra note 14, at 794–95. Macey notes that corruption in the
subprime lending market only increased with the development of the “yield spread
premium (“YSP”), a device developed to provide incentives for mortgage brokers” to
talk consumers into taking on higher-interest mortgages by providing kickbacks to
the brokers based on the difference between the average interest rate on that day
and the interest rate attached to the loan the broker talks the unwitting borrower
into. Id.; see also Stolly, supra note 13, at 304 (“A common example of a kickback is
when the lender tells the mortgage broker it will lend at a 15% rate, and in turn, the
broker tells the customer that they will get them a 15.25% rate, and the amount
above the 15% goes to the broker as a ‘kickback.’ ”).
36
See Stolly, supra note 13, at 294–96 (noting that predatory lenders
aggressively target victims based on their low income, race, gender, or age).
37
See id. at 294–95 (describing the predatory practice of “steering” as “ ‘the
practice of directing consumers to high rate/high cost loans based simply on their
race or economic status and their lack of information, rather than based on their
credit histories or credit risks’ ” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 72
(2000)).
38
See Murken, supra note 22 (describing flipping as an “exploitative technique
some predatory lenders use . . . where the lender will convince an unwitting
consumer to needlessly refinance a loan, sometimes several times, racking up more
fees and points each time”).
39
Stolly, supra note 13, at 297 (describing a “no doc loan” as one “in which
lenders allow borrowers to state any amount of income they desire while providing
no proof of employment or income” and a “liar loan” as one where “the income is
exaggerated to a level that guarantees the approval of the loan”).
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consumers, lenders issued them subprime mortgages, which
resulted in higher costs to the consumer 40 and which, ultimately,
many consumers were unable to repay. 41
Eventually, the “unprecedented boom of mortgage activity”
that this country experienced between 2001 and 2006 slowed “as
rising interest rates and declining house values began affecting
consumers in the subprime market.” 42 The decline in home
values around this time prevented subprime borrowers from
refinancing their mortgages, and thus, they could no longer avoid
having to pay the much higher floating interest rates that kicked
in after the two-year “teaser” rate had ceased. 43 Consumers who
entered into subprime mortgages were unable to make their
payments, and they defaulted at an overwhelming pace. 44
B. TILA as an Escape Valve
Congress enacted TILA in large part to enable consumers to
make informed choices when they enter into credit contracts with
lenders.
Prior to TILA, credit contracts were confusing
documents with unclear terms that very few consumers truly
understood. 45 Congress created TILA to allow consumers to
make informed choices when shopping for credit; 46 it requires
that lenders make a great deal of information about a credit
transaction available to the consumer and to do business in a

40
See Maman, supra note 14, at 203 (noting that subprime mortgages “generally
result[ ] in higher costs of credit for subprime borrowers in terms of rates and fees
and loan terms”).
41
See Stolly, supra note 13, at 291.
42
Maman, supra note 14, at 195.
43
See Macey et al., supra note 14, at 802–03.
44
See Maman, supra note 14, at 195 (noting that since the housing bubble burst
in 2006–2007, “subprime . . . mortgage delinquencies have reached unprecedented
levels and mortgage foreclosures are now at an all time high”); see also Vikas Bajaj,
Builders and Homeowners Under Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2008, at 1 (“The
Mortgage Bankers Association reported . . . that loans past due or in foreclosure
jumped to 7.9 percent . . . from 7.3 percent at the end of September [2007] and 6.1
percent from December 2006.”).
45
See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer
Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 875–
76 (2003).
46
See Daniel Rothstein, Comment, Truth in Lending: The Right To Rescind and
the Statute of Limitations, 14 PACE L. REV. 633, 635 (1994) (remarking that TILA
was meant to be “an information protection device aimed at allowing informed credit
shopping”).
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transparent way. 47 Under TILA, lenders are required to disclose
the terms of credit contracts “in a clear and uniform manner.” 48
One way TILA protects consumers is by giving them substantial
leverage over lenders and by creating mechanisms to make
consumers whole should they be taken advantage of by
unscrupulous or predatory lenders. 49
TILA provides an important safety valve by giving
consumers the right to rescind a credit transaction within three
business days where the consumer’s home is used as a security
interest. 50 During these three days, the consumer is free to
rescind the mortgage for any reason or no reason at all. 51 If,
however, the lender has failed to make material disclosures to
the consumer at the outset of the transaction, the consumer’s
right to rescind may be extended to three years. 52 Information
that is regarded as material includes
the annual percentage rate, the method of determining the
finance charge and the balance upon which a finance charge
will be imposed, the amount of the finance charge, the amount

47
See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure
a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use
of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing
and credit card practices.”).
48
See Peterson, supra note 45, at 876–77.
49
See Williams v. Homestake Mortg. Co., 968 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 1992)
(“Though one goal of the statutory rescission process is to place the consumer in a
much stronger b argaining position, another goal of § 1635(b) is to return the parties
most nearly to the position they held prior to entering into the transaction.”).
50
See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (“[I]n the case of any consumer credit
transaction . . . in which a security interest . . . is or will be retained or acquired in
any property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person to whom credit is
extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction until midnight
of the third business day following the consummation of the transaction or the
delivery of the information and rescission forms required under this section together
with a statement containing the material disclosures required under this
subchapter, whichever is later, by notifying the creditor . . . of his intention to do
so.”).
51
See TJAGSA Practice Notes: Legal Assistance Items, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1990,
at 44 (“At this stage, a consumer need not have or provide a reason for the rescission;
the right to rescind during the first three days is unlimited.”). This three-day period
is often referred to as the consumer’s “cooling-off period.” See Rothstein, supra note
46, at 633.
52
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2010) (“If the required notice or material
disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after
consummation, upon transfer of all of the consumer’s interest in the property, or
upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).
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to be financed, the total of payments, the number and amount of
payments, the due dates or periods of payments scheduled to
repay the indebtedness, and the disclosures required by section
1639(a) of [TILA]. 53

The lender can use model forms provided by Regulation Z to
inform the borrower of his rights in a simple and easily
understandable manner. 54
Along with the other required TILA disclosures, the lender
must also provide the consumer with notice of his right to
rescind. 55 The notice of the right to rescind must “clearly and
conspicuously disclose” 56 several pieces of information, including
“[t]he date the rescission period expires.” 57 This “clear and
conspicuous” standard means that “[i]f the notice is subject to
two or more sensible readings that produce different results, then
the creditor has not given a clear disclosure” and the consumer is
entitled to the extended three-year rescission period. 58
Additionally, a consumer can exercise his right to rescind if the
lender failed to use a statutorily appropriate form for the notice
of the right to rescind or did not comply with other statutory
notice requirements. 59
53
15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(u) (West 2011); see also id. § 1639(a)–(b) (requiring the
lender to make specific disclosures regarding the consumer’s completion of the
agreement; the consequences of making the loan and the annual percentage rate;
and laying out guidelines for the time in which the lender must make disclosures to
the consumer); 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006) (providing that a lender who “willfully and
knowingly” fails to make the required disclosures “shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both”).
54
See 12 C.F.R. § 226 app. H; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (providing “model
disclosure forms” as a means to encourage lenders to comply with the material
disclosures requirement as well as to help the consumer to “understand[ ] the
transaction by utilizing readily understandable language to simplify the technical
nature of the disclosures”).
55
See Elwin Griffith, The Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Confronting the
Challenge in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 345, 370
(2003).
56
12 C.F.R. § 226.23(b)(1).
57
See id. § 226.23(b)(1)(v); see also Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 701–02 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If the lending institution omits the
expiration date and fails to cure the omission by subsequently providing the
information, the borrower may rescind the loan within three years after it was
consummated.”).
58
Griffith, supra note 55, at 377.
59
See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(i)(1) (“[A]fter the initiation of any judicial or nonjudicial
foreclosure process on the primary dwelling of an obligor securing an extension of
credit, the obligor shall have a right to rescind the transaction . . . if . . . the form of
notice of rescission for the transaction is not the appropriate form of written notice
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Rescission is meant to return the parties—the consumer and
lender—to the positions they were in before the transaction
occurred. 60 If the loan is rescinded under TILA, “the security
interest is dissolved, the lender returns the borrower’s payments,
and the borrower returns the loan proceeds, less any ‘finance or
other charge.’ ” 61 Under this sequence of events, the lender “is
supposed to return the consumer’s property and terminate the
security interest once the consumer notifies him of rescission”
and before the consumer has returned any money or property to
the lender. 62 The problem with this exchange from a lender’s
perspective is that it generally favors consumers far more
heavily, especially when the consumer invokes his or her right to
rescind as a defense to a lender’s foreclosure action in response to
the consumer’s mortgage default. 63 A consumer who is allowed to
rescind a loan several years after the transaction has to give back
whatever money he or she received from the lender, but the
lender has to give back everything the consumer paid over that
same time period—generally leading to the lender losing out on
the interest it was supposed to be collecting on that loan. 64 The
consumer is put back in the position he or she was in before the
transaction, but the lender essentially has to take a loss.
II. DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
The traditional approach to technical violations of TILA has
been to apply a type of strict liability standard. Over the years,
circuit courts have held that technical violations of TILA, such as
failing to include the expiration date of the rescission period,
entitle the borrower to an extended three-year rescission
period. 65 Recently, however, the First Circuit departed from
published and adopted by the Board or a comparable written notice, and otherwise
complied with all the requirements of this section regarding notice.”).
60
See Griffith, supra note 55 (“The result of a consumer’s rescission is that the
parties return to the status quo ante, and the consumer is not responsible for any
costs or charges associated with the loan.”).
61
Semar, 791 F.2d at 702.
62
Elwin J. Griffith, Truth in Lending—Rescission, Consumer Remedies and
Creditor Defenses in Closed-End Transactions, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 491, 508–09
(1988).
63
See Rothstein, supra note 46, at 637.
64
See id. at 657 (“The essential effect of the remedy is to afford the consumer an
interest-free loan from the date of the transaction to the exchange of money after
rescission.”).
65
See infra Part II.A.
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tradition and instead chose to apply a reasonable person
standard. Under this standard, the borrower is not entitled to an
automatic extension of his rescission period based on a technical
violation of TILA. Rather, whether he receives the extended
period depends on the borrower’s ability as an average,
reasonable person to understand when his rescission period
expired, regardless of the lender’s failure to include that date in
the notice. 66
A.

Traditional Approach: Technical TILA Violation Merits
Extended Rescission Period

For almost three decades, circuit courts have consistently
ruled that a lender’s failure to include the expiration of the threeday rescission period in the notice of the right to rescind was a
technical violation of TILA, entitling the consumer to the
extended three-year rescission period. 67 In 1983, the Fifth
Circuit ruled in Williamson v. Lafferty that the lender’s failure to
provide the expiration date of the three-day rescission period in a
consumer’s notice of the right to rescind was an automatic
violation of TILA entitling the consumer to retain her right to
rescind for three years. 68 In Williamson, the Plaintiff consumer
had signed all of the documents, including a notice of the right to
rescind, necessary to create a deed of trust to her property in
order to finance some improvements on her home. 69 The notice
included a space for the lender to fill in the expiration date of the
three-day rescission period, but the lender failed to provide that
date. 70
Although the lender argued that the consumer could have
calculated when the rescission period expired because the date of
the transaction was on the paperwork, the Fifth Circuit rejected
this reasoning, stating, “the precise purpose of requiring the
creditor to fill in the date is to prevent the customer from having

See infra Part II.B.
See Griffith, supra note 62, at 504–05 (noting that in two cases it was
appropriate for the courts to extend the consumers’ rescission periods because “the
omission of the expiration date on the notice was really a technical violation
but . . . the [consumer] had a right to rely on that mandatory requirement in the
Regulation”).
68
See Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768–69 (5th Cir. 1983).
69
Id. at 768.
70
Id.
66
67
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to calculate three business days.” 71 This approach has been
commended as “sensible . . . because the disclosure of a specific
date would forestall any disagreement about the end of the
rescission period.” 72
That same year, the Fourth Circuit made a similar ruling in
Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., reversing the
judgment of the district court that had ruled that technical TILA
violations that did not cause the Plaintiff any actual injury did
not give rise to creditor liability. 73 The Plaintiff consumer in that
case argued that a number of technical TILA violations in the
disclosure form, such as minor variations in terminology and an
instance of the wrong font size, should give rise to liability on the
part of the lender. 74 The district court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the minor violations “could not have influenced
[the consumer’s] choice of credit” and thus, the purpose of TILA
was still met. 75
The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that even though
Plaintiff had not sustained any actual injury from the minor
TILA violations, because the purpose of TILA is to protect
consumers, lenders must comply strictly with TILA regulations. 76
Therefore, the lender’s failure to adhere to those regulations gave
rise to liability and the consumer was entitled to statutory
damages, the cost of bringing the action, and reasonable attorney
fees. 77
Three years later, in Semar v. Platte Valley Federal Savings
& Loan Ass’n, the Ninth Circuit faced a similar question when
Plaintiff homeowners argued that they were entitled to a threeyear rescission period due to the lender’s failure to provide the
expiration date of the rescission period in the notice of the right
to rescind. 78 The consumers had taken out a fifteen-year,

71
Id. at 769 n.3. A “business day” is defined as “[a] day that most institutions
open for business, usu. a day on which banks and major stock exchanges are open,
excluding Saturdays and Sundays.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (9th ed. 2009).
72
Griffith, supra note 62, at 505.
73
713 F.2d 65, 66 (4th Cir. 1983).
74
See id.
75
Id. at 67.
76
See id. (“To insure that the consumer is protected, as Congress envisioned,
requires that the provisions of the Act and the regulations implementing it be
absolutely complied with and strictly enforced.”).
77
See id.
78
791 F.2d 699, 701–02 (9th Cir. 1986).
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$134,000 loan with a 16.875% annual interest rate. 79 After
making thirteen payments totaling $26,655.33, the consumers
defaulted. 80 The lender began foreclosure proceedings upon
default, and the consumers defensively brought an action to
rescind. 81
Part of the consumers’ argument was that the lender had
omitted the expiration date of the rescission period, although it
did state in the paper work that “the rescission right expired
three business days after July 16.” 82 They argued that, like the
consumer in Williamson, the technical TILA violation entitled
them to an extended three-year rescission period. 83
The Ninth Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court’s
ruling that the technical TILA violation entitled the Plaintiffs to
the three-year extension of their rescission rights. The court
reasoned that “[t]echnical or minor violations of TILA . . . as well
as major violations, impose liability on the creditor and entitle
the borrower to rescind.” 84 In fact, the court went so far as to say
that it need not even reach the other prong of the consumers’
argument for rescission; a simple technical violation in this case
was dispositive. 85
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit disapproved of the lender’s
argument that the court ought to exercise its equitable discretion
based on how sympathetic or unsympathetic the particular
consumer is or how much protection any given consumer
warranted. 86 In rejecting that argument, the court reasoned that
deciding cases based on how sympathetic the plaintiff is, or
appears to be, “would frustrate the very purpose of TILA.
Congress did not intend for TILA to apply only to sympathetic
consumers; Congress designed the law to apply to all consumers,
who are inherently at a disadvantage in loan and credit
transactions.” 87 Consequently, the court endorsed the district

Id. at 701 n.2.
Id. at 702.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 704–05.
84
Id. at 704.
85
See id. at 703.
86
See id. at 704 (defendant lender argued that its case should be distinguished
from the earlier Williamson v. Lafferty because plaintiff in that case was more
sympathetic and in need of protection than plaintiff in the case at hand).
87
Id. at 705.
79
80
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court’s finding that, although the consumers in this case were
“unsympathetic plaintiffs,” they were nevertheless entitled to
rescission based on the technical TILA violation. 88 Moreover, the
court noted that “case law was contrary to [the lender’s] assertion
that courts should assert equitable powers in cases with
unsympathetic facts.” 89
B. The First Circuit’s New “Reasonable Person” Approach
Recently, however, in Melfi v. WMC Mortgage Corp., 90 the
First Circuit departed from this well-established principle of
extending the rescission period for technical TILA violations. In
Melfi, a homeowner who refinanced his home mortgage
attempted to rescind the transaction twenty months after
consummation of the loan, arguing that he was entitled to a
three-year rescission period because the blanks for the date of
the transaction 91 and the deadline of the three-day right to
rescind were left blank 92 .
When the consumer brought his case in the district court, he
relied on Semar and Williamson in arguing for an extended
rescission period. 93 The district court pointed out, however, that
in Santos Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 94 the First Circuit
had already rejected the strict liability test that those two
cases promulgated by announcing, “we do not require perfect
disclosure. The question before us is . . . only whether the
notification [the consumer] actually received met the
requirements of the clear and conspicuous standard laid out in
Regulation Z.” 95 The court in Santos-Rodriguez concluded that it
was required to evaluate the lender’s disclosure “from the
Id. at 704.
Id.
90
568 F.3d 309 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010).
91
Id. at 310 (noting that although the blank was not filled in, the date of the
transaction was “stamped on the top right corner of the notice”).
92
Id.
93
Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. 08-024ML, 2009 WL 64338, at *2 (D.R.I.
2009).
94
Santos-Rodriguez v. Doral Mortg. Corp., 485 F.3d 12, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2007).
This case involved two sets of consumers who each defaulted on the original home
loan they obtained from defendant buyer, elected to refinance with the same lender
to avoid foreclosure. Id. Two years after consummation of the refinancing loans
attempted to rescind, claiming that they had three years to do so on the basis of the
lender’s “alleged failure to disclose properly their rescission rights.” Id.
95
Id. at 18; see also Melfi, 2009 WL 64338, at *2.
88
89
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vantage point of the hypothetical average consumer” 96 and that
from that perspective, extension of the rescission period was
inappropriate. 97 Based on this precedent, the district court in
Melfi determined that the lender’s notice was sufficient and that
the consumer therefore was not entitled to the extended
rescission period. 98
In affirming the district court’s denial of extension of the
rescission period, the First Circuit again departed from the
previous circuits’ rulings that a technical TILA violation
warranted extension of the rescission period, claiming that the
previous circuits’ decisions were outdated. 99 It noted with
disapprobation that the consumer’s argument for extension of the
rescission period was dependent on the principle “that any flaw
or deviation should be penalized automatically in order to deter
such errors in the future.” 100 The court went on to reject the
argument that Congress intended for technical violations to lead
to extension of the rescission period in order to protect the
consumer, 101 instead contending that Congress had amended
TILA specifically to combat the problem of “widespread rescission
for minor violations.” 102 The First Circuit therefore declared that

Santos-Rodriguez, 485 F.3d at 18.
See id. (concluding that “because plaintiffs were told, clearly and
conspicuously, that rescission would only operate as to their pending refinance
transaction, any conclusions that they might have drawn from that disclosure about
their previously existing mortgages were unreasonable (and, thus, not a valid basis
for any TILA claim)”).
98
See Melfi v. WMC Mort. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 311–13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010).
99
See id. at 312 (arguing that “the circuit cases are now elderly and may be in
tension with later TILA amendments”).
100
Id. at 313.
101
See id. (“[T]here is no evidence in TILA or any Board regulation that either
Congress or the Board intended to render the form a nullity because of an
uncompleted blank in the form or similar flaw where, as here, it could not possibly
have caused [the consumer] to think that he had months in order to rescind.”).
102
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(h) (2006) (“An obligor shall have no rescission
rights arising solely from the form of written notice used by the creditor to inform
the obligor of the rights of the obligor under this section, if the creditor provided the
obligor the appropriate form of written notice published and adopted by the Board,
or a comparable written notice of the rights of the obligor, that was properly
completed by the creditor, and otherwise complied with all other requirements of
this section regarding notice.”).
96
97
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technical deficiencies do not matter if the borrower receives a
notice that effectively gives him notice as to the final date for
rescission and has the three full days to act. Our test is
whether any reasonable person, in reading the form provided in
this case, would so understand it. 103

The court seemed to base its ruling on the suspicion of
consumer wrongdoing, claiming that “[t]he incentives for a
borrower to [attempt to have a mortgage transaction rescinded
well after the three-day cooling-off period has expired] may be
substantial where a new loan is available, especially if rates have
fallen or substantial interest has been paid during the period of
the original loan.” 104 The First Circuit concluded that allowing a
“reasonable borrower [who could not] have been misled” to take
advantage of the lender’s minor omission and rescind his loan
after almost two years would be to grant that borrower a
Because the court saw this outcome as
windfall. 105
fundamentally unfair and inconsistent with TILA’s purpose, the
First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the three-year
extension, preventing the consumer from rescinding his loan. 106
III. CREATING A NEW STANDARD: TRANSFORMING STRICT
LIABILITY INTO A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
Although the First Circuit’s concerns about the strict
liability test previously employed by the circuit courts in these
Truth in Lending Act cases were valid, in applying a reasonable
person test instead, the First Circuit failed to uphold the
purposes of TILA: to protect consumers and provide incentive to
lenders to be clear and honest in their dealings with consumers.
If courts were to presume that borrowers did not know when
their rescission periods ended due to the lenders’ failures to
include the ending dates but to allow the lenders to rebut that
presumption through evidence of the contents of the notice or the
sophistication of a particular borrower, for example, they would
dispel the uneasiness of the First Circuit with the strict liability
test but also uphold the goals of TILA.

103
104
105
106

Melfi, 568 F.3d at 312.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 313.
See id.
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The First Circuit was addressing a very real problem in its
move from the traditional strict liability standard to a new
reasonable person test. It recognized that in some cases,
consumers did know when their rescission period expired and
that those consumers may be trying to take advantage of a
loophole years later to rid themselves of disadvantageous
mortgages. 107 The strict liability approach grants the extended
rescission period for any technical TILA violation 108 and thus
does not distinguish between borrowers who did not understand
their rescission forms and borrowers who clearly understood
when the three-day rescission period expired in spite of the
lender’s failure explicitly to provide that date. Moreover, the
strict liability approach goes beyond Congress’s purpose in
creating TILA by establishing lender liability over what is, in the
grand scheme of things, a relatively minor omission.
The purpose of TILA is to protect consumers and allow them
to make informed credit choices. The senators who supported
creating TILA were mainly concerned with “the costs of credit to
the borrower,” specifically the details of the finance charge
associated with a particular transaction. 109 When Congress was
formulating TILA, however, they were concerned mainly with
fraud and very serious abuses by lenders. Congress’s intent was
to protect borrowers from “fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly
misleading information, advertising, labeling, or other
practices.” 110 The ultimate motivation behind the creation of
TILA was the belief that borrowers were “entitled to know the
truth about credit rates and charges.” 111 To punish lenders for
failing to include the expiration date of the rescission period in

See id. at 312 The court explained that the consumer must have known when
the three-day rescission period expired because the consumer was given all of the
appropriate forms on the closing date of the loan, that date was stamped on the
paperwork, and “it is easy enough to count three days.” Id. Thus, no reasonable
consumer could have been misled by the omission of the expiration date. Id.
108
See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 704 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“Technical or minor violations of TILA or Reg Z, as well as major
violations, impose liability on the creditor and entitle the borrower to rescind.”).
109
109 CONG. REC. 2027 (1963).
110
Id. at 2029.
111
Id.
107
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the transaction paperwork would be to go beyond Congress’s
intent in creating TILA, which was to protect borrowers against
much more serious fraud. 112
The First Circuit was cognizant of the fact that there are
sophisticated consumers who enter into mortgage agreements
fully able to understand the rescission notice, and they should
not be allowed to use a minor infraction on the part of the lender
to rescind a loan after the three business days are up. 113 The
First Circuit is correct that we should be hesitant to allow any
and all consumers to take advantage of an extended rescission
period for such a small error and that there are some situations
where the consumer who invokes TILA simply does not need its
protection. 114
Nevertheless, the reasonable person test promulgated by the
First Circuit as a solution to this problem will create an unfair
result when applied to cases where a consumer is seeking to
rescind a subprime mortgage. The essence of this problem
springs from the basic predatory lending practices that, in many
cases, have overlapped with subprime lending over the past few
years. 115 Lenders targeted potential borrowers that they thought
they could convince to take on a subprime loan—people who were
relatively unsophisticated and uneducated, who were unlikely to
read and understand the paperwork accompanying the

112
See id. at 2028 (“Our objective is merely to strip away the disguises which
frequently hide or distort the true price of credit.”).
113
See Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 310 (1st Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010). The court’s statement that there may be significant
incentives for a borrower to attempt to rescind a loan transaction when certain
conditions exist is a strong indication that this is what the court had in mind when it
made this ruling. In essence, the court does not want to allow a borrower who
understood that he only had three days to rescind his transaction to use the lender’s
minor mistake as a loophole to attempt to get out of the transaction at a much later
date and for some other reason.
114
For an example of this type of situation, see Burke v. Yingling, 666 A.2d 288,
290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (finding that a consumer was not entitled to the protection
of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) because he
was a sophisticated consumer who had initiated the transaction and had negotiated
the terms of the contract himself and thus, fell outside of the purview of the
UTPCPL).
115
See Maman, supra note 14, at 204 (noting that “the characteristics of
subprime mortgage lending, with its borrowers’ demographics and higher rates and
fees, makes it fertile ground for lending abuse where predatory lending is
unfortunately prevalent”).
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transaction, and who would not understand enough about
subprime loans to realize that they simply could not afford to
take on that kind of financial risk. 116
When analyzed in that context, the First Circuit’s approach
creates two problems. First, it fails to take into account the
realities of the subprime mortgage market and the underlying
predatory lending that occurred in that market.
Most
significantly, it applies a reasonable person standard to
consumers that predatory lenders expected not to be reasonable.
Given the nature of predatory lending, it is no longer appropriate
to “evaluate the adequacy of TILA disclosures from the vantage
point of a hypothetical average consumer . . . who is neither
particularly sophisticated nor particularly dense.” 117 Predatory
lenders were not targeting “average consumers” or “any
They targeted consumers that they
reasonable person.” 118
thought they could coerce into taking on subprime loans so that
the lender, and individual mortgage brokers, could make more
money. 119 It is unfair to impose a reasonable person standard on
consumers who are trying to rescind their subprime loans when
so often they entered into those loans because they were targeted
and victimized by predatory lenders because of some perceived
disadvantage or vulnerability. Thus, the reasonable person test
fails to uphold to the primary tenet of TILA: to protect vulnerable
consumers. 120 It leaves members of those communities who are
exploited by predatory lenders with one less remedy to protect
themselves.
Second, the reasonable person test imposes a burden on the
consumer that TILA does not contemplate. The purpose of TILA
was to impose a burden on the lender to provide adequate

See Stolly, supra note 13, at 294–95 (explaining that subprime lending
crosses over into predatory lending when lenders purposefully and systematically
target vulnerable consumers in communities that were traditionally disadvantaged
when it came to obtaining credit).
117
Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2006).
118
See, e.g., Stolly, supra note 13, at 296 (explaining that oftentimes predatory
lenders target the elderly because they “may lack an adequate understanding of the
complexities of financial transactions . . . or understand their credit-worthiness” and
because “they may never have been involved with financial affairs”).
119
See supra text accompanying notes 29–31.
120
See Peterson, supra note 45, at 884 (“Disclosure regulations provide
consumers with an important opportunity to protect themselves from credit bargains
that are not truly in their own best interests.”).
116
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disclosures to consumers. 121
The reasonable person test,
however, imposes a burden on the consumer to determine based
on the face of the rescission notice the date when the rescission
period expires if the lender has not followed his statutory duty to
include that date in the notice. 122
If the First Circuit’s
hypothetical “reasonable person” could have determined from the
face of that notice when the three-day rescission period expired,
then the consumer is out of luck and cannot rescind the
transaction on the basis of the lender’s failure to include the
expiration date of the rescission period.
A test is needed, therefore, that will address the specific
problem of predatory lending in the subprime market and that
also will ensure that the burden remains on the lender rather
than imposing a new one on the consumer. A more fair
methodology would be to create a rebuttable presumption that,
absent the lender’s insertion of the expiration date of the
rescission period, the borrower was unaware of when that
expiration date would occur and therefore is entitled to the threeyear rescission period. The lender assumes the burden of proof to
rebut this presumption by proving that the borrower did
understand when the rescission period expired. In marshalling
its argument, the lender may rely on a number of factors,
including but not limited to: whether the date the transaction
was consummated was included conspicuously elsewhere in the
rescission notice, if the borrower was notified in some other
way—perhaps in person or over the phone—about when the
rescission period would expire, and the borrower’s sophistication
and ability to understand the rescission notice. 123 Essentially,
the lender will have the burden of proving that all of its actions
were, although careless, not intentionally deceptive and that the
borrower was able to ascertain the expiration date despite the
lender’s omission.
See supra text accompanying notes 35–38.
Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 312 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating that
“technical deficiencies do not matter if the borrower receives a notice that effectively
gives him notice as to the final date for rescission”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1058
(2010).
123
For an argument that the borrower’s ability to understand the notice should
not be a consideration, see Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.
2006) (announcing that in TILA cases, courts have “focused the lens of [their
inquiries] on the text of the disclosures themselves rather than on plaintiffs’
descriptions of their subjective understandings”).
121
122
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Another benefit of the rebuttable presumption is that, like
the strict liability test, it provides an incentive for the lender to
make sure to include the expiration date of the rescission period
in the notice of the borrower’s right to rescind. It costs the lender
essentially nothing to calculate the three days and ensure that
the date is included where it is supposed to be in the paperwork.
On the other hand, if the lender fails to do this, it will be forced
to go to court to explain why that failure should not entitle the
borrower to the extended rescission period. This will entail
extensive discovery—in many cases discovery of personal
information about the borrower that is in the borrower’s
particular control. When weighing the cost of such a proceeding
against the cost of simply stamping the expiration date in the
rescission notice, it is clear that paying attention to detail will
result in the lender potentially saving a great deal of money.
Most importantly, the rebuttable presumption will result in
a much more fair result, both for borrowers and lenders. For
example, in Williamson v. Lafferty, the borrower, Eloise
Williamson, was “a divorced 43-year-old mother of seven
children, three of whom she still support[ed] with her earnings as
a cook.” 124 Ms. Williamson owned a home and had a mortgage. 125
A representative of the lender contacted Ms. Williamson and
solicited from her a contract to add a garage on to her home and
to put an addition on her home. 126 Ms. Williamson signed the
contract, and as part of the transaction, she executed a deed of
trust security interest in her home. 127
In applying the rebuttable presumption methodology, when
this case came before the court, the court would assume that
because the lender failed to include the expiration date, Ms.
Williamson did not know when her rescission period ended and
that therefore she would be entitled to the longer rescission
period.
The lender, however, would have the option of
attempting to rebut this presumption by arguing that Ms.
Williamson did know when the rescission period ended, despite
its failure to include that date in the paperwork. The lender’s
primary argument would be that the date of the transaction was
included elsewhere in the paperwork, so it would have been
124
125
126
127

Williamson v. Lafferty, 698 F.2d 767, 768 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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simple for Ms. Williamson to read the rescission provision and
calculate for herself when her three-day rescission period
expired. 128 The lender’s argument would likely not be strong
enough to rebut the presumption against it, however, because
even though the date of the transaction was included elsewhere
in the paperwork, Ms. Williamson seems to have been a
relatively unsophisticated consumer who was not likely to have
read the paperwork accompanying the transaction. Moreover,
the lender did not even complete one of the forms, the deed of
trust to Ms. Williamson’s property, until after Ms. Williamson
had signed the document. 129 This demonstrates a general lack of
honesty and transparency by the lender and thus resembles the
fraudulent and deceitful practices with which Congress was
concerned when it began drafting TILA. 130
In Melfi, discussed above, 131 however, the lender would most
likely have a much better chance at rebutting the presumption
against it. In that case, the notice of rescission that Mr. Melfi
received from the lender was very clear. It explained:
You have a legal right under federal law to cancel this
transaction, without cost, within THREE BUSINESS DAYS
from whichever of the following events occurs LAST: (1) The
date of the transaction, which is __________; or (2) The date you
receive your Truth in Lending Act disclosures; or (3) The date
you received this notice of your right to cancel. 132

The lender could argue that even though the blank for the
date of the transaction was not filled in, the form did have the
date of the transaction stamped at the top of the notice. 133 The
lender could also argue that because the date of the transaction
was included conspicuously on the notice, Mr. Melfi needed only
to turn to the rescission provision for guidance on how to
calculate the three days based on that date.
The lender in Semar would have the strongest argument,
however, because in that case, although the lender had failed to
include the actual expiration date of the rescission period, the
notice very clearly indicated that the rescission right would
See id. at 769 n.3.
Id. at 768.
130
See supra text accompanying notes 106–07.
131
See supra notes 91–105 and accompanying text.
132
Melfi v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 568 F.3d 309, 311 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1058 (2010).
133
See id.
128
129
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expire three business days after July 16. 134 Thus, to rebut the
presumption in favor of the borrower, the lender could argue that
the expiration date of the rescission period was constructively
included in the notice, even if the expiration date itself was not
exactly where it was supposed to be or stated as explicitly as it
should have been.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the collapse of the housing market, fueled by
the proliferation of subprime mortgages and predatory lending
practices, foreclosure proceedings have risen dramatically, and
consumers are looking for any and all defenses to those
proceedings, including using the lender’s technical TILA
violations essentially as loopholes. Our society has an interest in
protecting its members who were victimized by predatory
lenders, while at the same time not rewarding those consumers
who understood their rescission notices and are using the
lender’s oversight as a loophole to get out of transactions that are
no longer favorable, as the First Circuit recognized. Rejecting
the First Circuit’s reasonable person test in favor of a rebuttable
presumption to determine whether a consumer should be granted
an extended rescission period fulfills the goal of protecting those
who need protection while preventing others from taking
advantage of a minor technical defect at the expense of lenders.
As a result, courts will strike a balance between upholding the
goals of TILA—protecting consumers and forcing lenders to be
forthright in their dealings—and basic fairness in preventing
borrowers from using a loophole to get out a bad mortgage by
taking advantage of a lender’s minor mistake.

134
See Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 702 (9th
Cir. 1986).

